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Nearsighted Justice
by Dan Bernhardt and Ed Nosal
Chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a
bankruptcy court. This paper identifies conditions under which it is optimal for the court to sometimes err
in determining whether a firm should be liquidated. Such errors can affect the optimal action choices by
both good and bad entrepreneurs. We first characterize the optimal error rate without renegotiation,
providing conditions under which it is optimal for the court both to sometimes mistakenly liquidate “good
firms,” but not “bad firms.” When creditors and debtors can renegotiate to circumvent an error-riven court
and creditors have all of the bargaining power, we show that for a broad class of action choices, a blind
court—one that ignores all information and hence is equally likely to liquidate a good firm as a bad one—
is optimal. For another class of action choices, the optimal court design places the burden of proof on the
entrepreneur. The robust feature is that in the optimal court design, the court sometimes errs in
determining whether a firm should be liquidated.
JEL Classification: G33, D80
Key Words: bankruptcy judge, moral hazard, adverse selection“It may not be optimal for justice to be blind, but it can help if she’s near-sighted.”
“If parties can negotiate out of the way of blind justice, blind may be best.”
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by
a bankruptcy court. It is often unclear whether it is socially optimal for a bankrupt ﬁrm to be
re-organized as a continuing entity, or whether it should be liquidated and the proceeds from
liquidation distributed. If creditors and debtors cannot reach a settlement, then the bankruptcy
court may impose one. This paper asks the following questions: Is it always optimal for the court to
make the ‘right’ decision? If liquidation is eﬃcient, should the court always mandate liquidation?
If the bankrupt ﬁrm could be a proﬁtable entity, should the court always allow it to re-structure
under the existing management and continue? Or is it optimal for the court to sometimes make
mistakes? How does the possibility of negotiated settlements aﬀect the optimal design of the court?
At one level the answers to these questions are straightforward. In a world where more accurate
appraisals of a ﬁrm’s quality are more costly, the optimal allocation by a court of resources to
evaluation of bankrupt ﬁrms will always reﬂect trade-oﬀs between the marginal costs of better
appraisals and the marginal beneﬁt of decision-making based on more accurate appraisals. In this
paper, we show that a court should also consider how the probability that it mis-identiﬁes the
quality of a bankrupt ﬁrm aﬀects the ex ante behavior of management, and hence the probability
that the ﬁrm becomes bankrupt.
We develop a simple model that abstracts completely from the increasing marginal costs of
more accurate appraisals in order to focus on how the probabilities that the court errs aﬀect both
the actions taken by management and outcomes. In a sparsely-speciﬁed model of entrepreneurial
ﬁnance we show that it may be optimal for the court to err occasionally. We consider an environment
in which some entrepreneurs are better than others, and their skills are private information. It is
eﬃcient to liquidate an entrepreneur if and only if he is bad.
Entrepreneurs also cannot be trusted. An entrepreneur can take hidden actions that aﬀect (a)
the probability that the ﬁrm cannot meet its loan obligations, (b) expected period entrepreneurial
proﬁts, and (c) expected period project revenues. We consider a broad variety of action interpre-
tations. For example, the action choices could be investment choices; some investments might be
risky negative NPV investments that pay oﬀ in non-bankruptcy states, but increase the probability
of low revenue, bankruptcy outcomes. Alternatively, the action choices could correspond to eﬀort,
the choice of whether to steal from the ﬁrm, the choice of whether to have a ﬁre sale of inventory
1that raises current revenues at the expense of lower future revenues, and so on.
There are at least three issues that might concern the court:
1. To identify which entrepreneurs are good and which ones are bad, so that bad ﬁrms, but not
good ones can be liquidated.
2. To discourage socially ineﬃcient action choices prior to bankruptcy.
3. To internalize the eﬀect of the court design on the incentives of entrepreneurs and creditors
to reach a settlement rather than leave the outcome to be decided by an error-prone court;
and the consequences for ex ante actions.
Unfortunately, these goals may conﬂict. One might like to use the threat of liquidation to dis-
courage a good entrepreneur from taking negative NPV gambles or under-exerting eﬀort. However,
if a good entrepreneur is always identiﬁed as such by the bankruptcy court, then liquidation is not
time consistent and, the entrepreneur realizing this, may take actions that reduce total surplus.
Conversely, if a bad entrepreneur is always identiﬁed as such by the bankruptcy court, he
may want to take actions that reduce the probability of entering bankruptcy. For example, this
aversion to bankruptcy may cause bad entrepreneurs to over-exert, or to engage in ﬁre sales that
ineﬃciently increase current revenues, reducing the probability of bankruptcy in the current period
at the expense of future revenues. It may be socially desirable to design the court so that it makes
some mistakes, thereby reducing a bad entrepreneur’s aversion to bankruptcy.
Thus, for both good entrepreneurs and bad, it may be optimal for the court to err occasionally:
1. The threat of mistakenly liquidating a good ﬁrm may be suﬃcient to keep it from, for example,
taking negative NPV gambles that raise the probability of entering bankruptcy.
2. The possibility that a bad ﬁrm is not identiﬁed by the court as such, may encourage a bad
entrepreneur to take actions that land the ﬁrm in bankruptcy with a higher probability. The
direct total surplus associated with the action that lands the ﬁrm in bankruptcy can be either
positive (if it discourages ﬁre sales), or negative (if it causes a bad entrepreneur to under-
exert, or to choose excessively safe, lower NPV projects). Even if the direct surplus eﬀect of
the court design on action choice is negative, it may still be optimal for the court to err if, as
a result, more bad entrepreneurs are liquidated at early dates.
We characterize the optimal rate at which the court should make mistakes, both when creditors
and entrepreneurs cannot bargain prior to the court’s decision, and when they may be able to
2reach a settlement that would obviate the need for the court to make a decision. The analyses
with and without renegotiation provide bounds on the beneﬁts of a court that makes mistakes.
When renegotiation is infeasible, any liquidating mistakes by the court must be incurred, making
an error-riven court less attractive, although not necessarily sub-optimal.
In contrast, the possibility of renegotiation allows the court to be designed as a potentially
costly back-up threat, but one that, in equilibrium, need not be used: the threat that the court
may make the wrong decision may be enough to encourage the parties to reach a settlement rather
than take their chances with an unreliable court. The analysis with renegotiation is subtle, because
the creditor does not know the entrepreneur’s type. The creditor must design payments that
discourage a good entrepreneur from passing himself oﬀ as bad in order to receive a payment for
liquidation, rather than make a payment to avoid going to court; and discourage a bad entrepreneur
from passing himself oﬀ as good in order to circumvent the court and continue to operate.
Stark results obtain when an entrepreneur and creditor can always renegotiate to circumvent an
error-riven court. We characterize the optimal court design for two broad classes of action choices,
those where it is optimal to
1. Discourage good entrepreneurs from taking actions that raise bankruptcy probabilities (theft,
perk consumption, risky NPV investments, shirking), while discouraging bad entrepreneurs
from taking actions that lower bankruptcy probabilities (ﬁre sales, working too hard, exces-
sively safe low NPV investments).
2. Discourage both good entrepreneurs and bad from taking actions that raise bankruptcy prob-
abilities.
For the ﬁrst class of economies, a simple blind court design always dominates a court that never
errs. Indeed, a blind court can sometimes implement the social optimum. That is, not only should
the court always be near-sighted and err in the identiﬁcation of entrepreneurs, but it should ignore
all information, essentially making liquidation decisions on the basis of a fair coin ﬂip. Even when
a blind court cannot always induce ex ante entrepreneurs to take optimal actions, as long as it
is optimal to encourage bad entrepreneurs to take actions that increase the chance that they are
liquidated, then a blind court dominates a court that makes no errors. For the second class of
economies, the social optimum can be implemented by placing a very stringent burden of proof on
entrepreneurs. The burden of proof is stringent in the sense that, although a bad entrepreneur is
never able to pass himself oﬀ as being good, a good entrepreneur may sometimes fail to convince
that court that he is, in fact, good.
3While the optimal court design diﬀers depending on the nature of the action choice, the key
features that they share are (i) the optimal court designs are simple, and easily implemented, and
(ii) the optimal court design is one in which the court errs.
Although we pose the model in the context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the problem that we
analyze is more fundamental. The general formulation is a dynamic principal-agent costly state
veriﬁcation environment in which the agent’s type is unknown and the principal and agent’s interests
are not aligned over action choice. The principal must choose the quality of an evaluation technology
to employ to verify the agent’s type, and the outcome of the evaluation aﬀects whether the agent
is retained. Sequential rationality implies that only the agent’s type is relevant for continuation
decisions, but type-contingent continuation probabilities aﬀect the agent’s decisions about which
action to take.
We could have presented our analysis in the context of shareholders in a ﬁrm who must decide
whether to incur the costs of investigating whether or not to replace management. Shareholders
do not want to incur the costs of investigating good managers, but they do want to discourage
good managers from taking actions that lower the ﬁrm value (build personal empires, steal, etc.);
shareholders may also want bad managers to take actions that lead to signals (lower immediate
proﬁts) indicating that the managers should be investigated and replaced. Shareholders may op-
timally choose a noisy evaluation technology for managers, both for reasons of costs and because
the possibility of mistakes may provide the right incentives for management: The noisy technology
may help deter ineﬃcient action choices by good managers, and help identify bad managers.
So, too, the analysis could have been posed in a venture capital/equity ﬁnance context. Here,
ongoing projects require a second-period injection of capital, and a ﬁnancier must decide whether
to provide the capital. The ﬁnancier will set a revenue standard such that if revenues exceed that
level, it will provide ﬁnancing; while for lesser levels, the ﬁnancier will evaluate the entrepreneur,
and depending on the (noisy) signal received decide whether to provide the additional capital. Ex
ante,t h eﬁnancier commits to the quality of the data on an entrepreneur that he will collect.
Our paper is related to least four diﬀerent literatures: the law and economics literature on
optimal court design; the law and economics literature on contracting in the face of an imperfect
and/or costly court; the bankruptcy literature; and the literature on the hold-up problem. We will
discuss, in turn, how our paper contributes to each of these areas.
Our paper contributes to the general law and economics literature on the optimal design of the
court. Existing research on court design focuses on how best to design the court in order to elicit
information from informed parties. This research builds on the “games of persuasion” literature
introduced by Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Here, an interested party who
4has private information attempts to inﬂu e n c ea na s y m m e t r i c a l l y - i n f o r m e dd e c i s i o nm a k e r .I nl a w
contexts, the interested parties are a plaintiﬀ and a defendant in a trial and the decision maker is a
judge. The judge, who wants to make the socially optimal decision, has to rule for one party, and
his decision is based on the information that he receives. The issues that arise are:
• Should a trial be based on an adversarial system, where the plaintiﬀ and defendant present
veriﬁable information to the judge and the judge makes his decision on the information
presented; or should the judge try to uncover the information himself (Shin (1998))?
• Should a judge restrict the information that can be presented (Fishman and Hagerty (1990))?
• Which interested party must provide the evidence in order to “win” the trial; that is, who
should bear the burden of proof (Hay and Spier (1997), Shin (1994), Sobel (1985))?
In this literature, the answers to these questions ultimately depend upon the quality of the
signal that the decision maker receives. For example, if restricting the information that the decision
maker receives increases the quality or the informativeness of the signal, then information should
be restricted, as this raises the probability of a correct decision. Most starkly, if, as in our model,
the decision maker has access to a costless technology that perfectly reveals the hidden information,
then in virtually all games of persuasion, the decision maker would use this technology.
What distinguishes our analysis from this literature is that in these games of persuasion the
analysis is ex post. That is, the actions that landed a plaintiﬀ and defendant in front of a judge are
not examined: the analysis begins with the plaintiﬀ and defendant in trial. It follows immediately
that better information is always preferred. In sharp contrast, our analysis explicitly models the
ex ante actions that could lead to a bankruptcy trial. Now the optimal signal that the judge
receives must strike a balance between ex ante and ex post considerations. Were the standard
literature to incorporate ex ante decision making into their persuasion games, then our analysis
strongly suggests that the most informative signal would be sub-optimal. One can interpret our
paper as contributing to this literature by modeling the ex ante decisions of the interested parties
and examining the implications for the optimal signal strength that the decision maker receives.
Our paper is also related to the law and economics literature on contracting in the face of
an imperfect or costly court. For example, Spier (1994) examines a situation where a victim can
experience either a mild or severe accident and the injurer can undertake costly precautions that can
reduce the probability and severity of an accident. If a court can observe the level of harm at “low”
cost, then it is optimal to set higher damage awards for higher levels of harm. In this situation, the
potential injurer invests in the ﬁrst-best level of precaution. If, instead, it is suﬃc i e n t l yc o s t l yf o r
5court to observe harm, the court sets a constant damage award and all victims and injurers settle out
of court. Although the court uses no resources, the potential injurer under-invests in precaution. As
in our paper, court behavior inﬂuences ex ante behavior. But, in important contrast, the ﬁrst-best
outcome would be achieved if the court costlessly observed the truth; in our model the ﬁrst-best
is unattainable if the court observes the truth. Grossman and Katz (1983) consider a situation
where a court makes mistakes and a risk-averse defendant is either innocent or guilty. Here, plea
bargains–which are eﬀective renegotiations–are optimal because they separate the innocent from
the guilty (guilty parties accept the plea bargain and innocent parties go to court). Thus, as in our
paper, allowing parties to renegotiate outside of court raises welfare; but again in Grossman and
Katz’ environment it is always optimal for the court not to err.
Our paper is closely related to the bankruptcy literature that explores how the optimal design
of bankruptcy law may introduce ex post distortions in resource allocations in order to alter the
ex ante behavior of management. Berkovitch et al. (1998) argues that “The structured bargaining
imposed by an optimal bankruptcy law provides the entrepreneur with optimal ex ante incentives
by placing him in a superior bargaining position in the negotiations triggered by ﬁnancial distress.
The bankruptcy law serves as a commitment device and is required to enforce this re-balancing of
the relative bargaining strengths of the claimants ex post.” Giammarino and Nosal (1994) provide
conditions where Chapter 11, as an option, can increase eﬃciency by providing management with
additional ex post bargaining strength. The additional bargaining strength implies that manage-
ment now has an incentive to take actions that enhance social welfare. Bernhardt and Lu (1998)
model the dynamic features of Chapter 11, exploring how the time allotted management to make
restructuring oﬀers aﬀects both ex post outcomes such as the timing of liquidation and settlement
outcomes, as well as the ex ante eﬀects on such managerial actions as eﬀort and project selection.
Finally, our paper is related to the hold-up literature begun by Williamson (1985). In a typical
hold-up problem model, agents take actions, observe outcomes, possibly renegotiate contracts, or
go to court and make ﬁnal exchanges. In the standard model, the court costlessly enforces only
those aspects of the contract that it can verify and some key attribute is unveriﬁable. When a
seller’s action is a costly investment that enhances the value of its good to the buyer, Che and
Hausch (1999) ﬁnd that if the court cannot verify the investment, then even if the amount traded
is veriﬁable, under-investment necessarily results. However, in a recent working paper, Willingston
(2002) shows that when the court is “blind,” in the sense that it randomly decides whether the seller
breached, then it is possible to devise a contract in which the seller makes the optimal investment.
This result mirrors ours in number of ways. Because the court makes errors, the parties prefer
to renegotiate the original contract to eliminate ex post ineﬃciencies, and it is the fact the court
m a k e se r r o r st h a tp r o m o t e so p t i m a lex ante behavior.
6The next section presents the basic model. We identify the costs and beneﬁts associated with
the courts making mistakes and develop the intuition for why courts may optimally choose to err.
By imposing only weak structure on the lending contract (in particular, the lending environment
need not be competitive), the nature of the possible action choices that an entrepreneur could take
and how they aﬀect bankruptcy probabilities, the section provides insights into the nature of the
liquidation mistakes that the courts might make. The intuition underlying the analysis is made
more transparent by giving the court complete ﬂexibility in the choice of monitoring technology
for each type of entrepreneur. In practice, however, the court generally does not have this kind
of ﬂexibility in choosing type contingent monitoring technologies. We, therefore, consider how the
results are altered when the court’s choices are more constrained. We do this for two broad sets of
economies: In section 3 the action choice corresponds either to undertaking perk consumption or
having a ﬁre sale, while in section 4 the action corresponds to theft or shirking. Section 5 concludes.
2 Unconstrained court evaluation technologies
A single risk-neutral entrepreneur requires external funding of one unit of capital to ﬁnance an ex
ante positive NPV project. The potentially two-period-lived project is ﬁnanced by a risk-neutral
investor through the ﬁnancing contract C. Neither entrepreneur nor investor discount payoﬀs. The
contract, which we describe below, speciﬁes both the payments to the investor as a function of
observed project revenues, as well as a revenue cutoﬀ such that for lower revenues the entrepreneur
is in default, cannot “meet” its contractual obligations and “enters bankruptcy.”
The project oﬀers random payoﬀs in two periods. The project is either good or bad. The timing
of events is such that the entrepreneur does not know the project type when the ﬁnancial contract
is negotiated with the investor, but does learn the type prior to taking any actions. The project’s
(or entrepreneur’s) type,   ∈ {g,b}, is private information to the entrepreneur. Let p( ) be the
probability that the entrepreneur is type  .
In the ﬁrst period, entrepreneur   chooses an action, a". Both the entrepreneur’s type,  ,a n d
his action choice, a",m a ya ﬀect:
• Total expected period project revenues, Rt( ,a "), t =1 ,2.
• Entrepreneurial expected period proﬁts, πt( ,a "), t =1 ,2.
• The probability B( ,a ") that a ﬁrm defaults on its contractual obligations at date 1.
• The value z( ,a ") of a ﬁrm that is liquidated at the end of period 1.
7The expected period payment to creditors is just the diﬀerence between expected period project
revenues and expected entrepreneurial proﬁts: Rt( ,a ") − πt( ,a ").
To simplify the presentation, we restrict attention to two action choices for each type of entre-
preneur, a" ∈ {a1
",a 2
"}.W eu s e“ ∆”t oc a p t u r et h ed i ﬀerence in the variables from taking action
a1
" i n s t e a do fa c t i o na2
".T h u s ,∆Rt( ) ≡ Rt( ,a 1
") − Rt( ,a 2
") is the diﬀerence in expected period t
revenues from taking action a1
" rather than a2
",a n ds oo n .
The key assumption that we make is that if entrepreneur   takes action a1
" then he is more likely
to default and end up in bankruptcy than if he takes action a2
":
A1: ∆B( ) ≡ B( ,a 1
") − B( ,a 2
") > 0.
Assumption A1 reduces to a normalization of the action choice if action choices have the same
signed impact on bankruptcy for both entrepreneur types.
Our formulation admits a broad variety of interpretations for the actions. For example, an
entrepreneur could be choosing whether or not to invest in a risky, negative NPV project that
raises expected period 1 proﬁts at the expense of expected total period 1 project revenues and an
increased likelihood of bankruptcy. Then action a1
" would correspond to making the risky, negative
NPV investment. Alternatively, a1
" c o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt os t e a l i n gf r o mp e r i o d1i n v e s t m e n t s ,w h i c h
again raises expected proﬁts at the expense of reducing expected period 1 project revenues and
raising the likelihood of bankruptcy. Another possibility is that the entrepreneur could be choosing
whether or not to have a “ﬁre sale” of existing inventory at bargain prices. In this case action
a2
" would correspond to having a ﬁre sale, since a ﬁre sale raises period 1 revenues and period 1
proﬁts, and reduces the likelihood of immediate bankruptcy. However, a ﬁre sale reduces future
revenues, proﬁts and liquidation values. With a slight modiﬁcation of the model (to allow for
non-pecuniary payoﬀs), action a1
" could correspond to shirking (working less hard), while action a2
"
could correspond to working hard (working harder).
Indeed, the actions contemplated by the two types of entrepreneurs could even diﬀer. For
example, suppose that the bad entrepreneur is in ﬁnancial distress, but the good entrepreneur is
not. The bad entrepreneur might be choosing between a ﬁre sale (a2
b)a n dn oﬁre sale (a1
b), while
the good entrepreneur is choosing whether to steal some of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period cash ﬂows (a1
g)o r
not (a2
g). Depending on the action interpretation, it could be socially optimal for the entrepreneur
to take the high default action a1
" (if action a2
" represents a ﬁre sale, or working excessively hard);
or the low default action a2
" (if action a1
" represents a negative NPV gamble, theft or shirking).
If a project is liquidated after the ﬁrst period, then it pays z( ,a ") to creditors and nothing to
the entrepreneur. We assume that it is eﬃcient to liquidate a project run by a bad entrepreneur,
8but ineﬃcient to liquidate a project run by a good entrepreneur:
A2: R2(g,ag) >z (g,ag) and R2(b,ab) <z (b,ab).
We also assume that the potential liquidation value is not observed by the court when making
decisions, and that if renegotiation is feasible, then terms cannot depend on z( ,a "). These as-
sumptions simply ensure that the liquidation value does not reveal type in our sparsely speciﬁed
environment. We will also discuss the impact of intermediate divisions between the entrepreneur
and creditor of the liquidation proceeds later.
Observed ﬁrst period project revenues are implicit in the bankruptcy probability speciﬁcation.
We do not directly specify realized ﬁrst period project revenues in order to be consistent with a
variety of possible forms of action choice, including, for example, theft–which leads to a distinction
between realized and observed ﬁrst period revenues–and shirking or risky investments–where
realized and observed ﬁrst period revenues correspond.
To be consistent with a variety of economic environments we impose little structure on the
ﬁnancing contract between entrepreneur and investor. In equilibrium, the investor must expect to
get back at least his one unit of capital investment from the ﬁrm. The analysis is consistent with
standard limited liability loan contracts, but also holds for more general ﬁnancing contracts.
If the ﬁrm “meets” its ﬁrst period contractual obligations, then the entrepreneur retains control
of the assets. If the ﬁrm defaults, then at a cost of c, that is incurred by the creditor, the bankruptcy
court evaluates the ﬁrm’s future prospects. The court then determines whether (a) the ﬁrm should
be liquidated; or (b) the entrepreneur should retain control and continue to operate the ﬁrm in
the second period. We assume that the bankruptcy costs are not so high, as to cease to make
liquidation valuable: z( ,a ") >c>0.
Initially, we preclude the possibility that the entrepreneur and creditors can renegotiate a set-
tlement to circumvent the bankruptcy court. As a result, the entrepreneur retains control of the
ﬁrm in the second period if and only if either (a) he meets his ﬁrst period contractual obligations,
or (b) he fails to meet his ﬁrst period contractual obligations, but the court chooses not to liquidate
the entrepreneur.
We model the design of the bankruptcy court as a pair (γ(g),γ(b)), where γ( ) is the probability
that the court concludes that the project has a negative NPV. If the entrepreneur defaults in period
1 and the court concludes that the project has a negative NPV, then the ﬁrm is liquidated and the
liquidated value, z( ,a ") > 0, is transferred to creditors. Assumption A2 implies that identifying
whether a project has a negative NPV amounts to identifying the entrepreneur’s type. Hence,
γ( ) can be interpreted as the probability that a type   ﬁrm is liquidated if it defaults in the
9ﬁrst period. Society (or the court) is benevolent, choosing (γ(g),γ(b)) to maximize ex ante total
expected revenues net of bankruptcy costs.
We interpret the court design (γ(g),γ(b)), as the choice of a “monitoring technology,” where the
technology attempts to assess whether the project that has gone into default has a positive NPV.
This interpretation is suﬃciently important to discuss in detail. The accuracy of the monitoring
technology’s assessment depends on the information provided. If, for example, all relevant infor-
mation regarding the project’s value is available and provided, then, in principle, the monitoring
technology could determine the project’s type with complete accuracy; if all relevant information
is not provided, then monitoring errors may be made. To highlight the intuition, we ﬁrst place no
restrictions on the evaluation technologies to which the court has access.
In practice, owing to “natural” informational asymmetries that exist between creditors and
debtors, the court may be unable to gather all relevant information. As a result, a court must
sometimes make undesigned mistakes, imposing lower bounds on the error probabilities. Our
analysis is best interpreted within the context of asking how the court should choose its design–
the rules of evidence that restrict the information which creditors and ﬁrms can present and hence
the information to which the court has access–in order to structure the probability of errors in
such a way as to enhance social welfare. Our analysis can be interpreted as providing a rationale
for the imposition of these kinds of rules: such rules cause courts to make (more) errors and we
will show that increasing errors is often optimal.
To illustrate how the court might design the rules of evidence so as to generate the “right”
(γ(g),γ(b)), suppose that it is optimal for the court to liquidate all bad ﬁrms, but to err occa-
sionally in the identiﬁcation of good ﬁrms. As a result, some good entrepreneurs who default are
(unfortunately) liquidated, but this possibility of liquidation may cause a good entrepreneur to
make better decisions when running the ﬁrm. The court could implement such rules of evidence
by placing the entire burden of proof on the entrepreneur: the ﬁrm is liquidated unless the entre-
preneur can prove that he is “good.” Since bad entrepreneurs can never do so, the choice of the
error-making probability amounts to restricting the rules of evidence about what evidence a good
entrepreneur can provide to attain the “right” error-making probability.
The court’s unrestricted evaluation technology provides a best case scenario for an error-riven
court. We later consider how outcomes are aﬀected when the court has access only to a more
limited set of feasible monitoring technologies.
Let Π( ,a ",γ( )) be the expected lifetime entrepreneurial proﬁts of a type   entrepreneur who
10takes action a" ∈ {a1
",a 2
"} given γ( ) and C:
Π( ,a ",γ( )) = [π1( ,a ")+( 1− B( ,a ")γ( ))π2( ,a ")].
At y p e  entrepreneur will choose the high default probability action, a" = a1
",i fi ti si nh i sb e s t
interest to do so, i.e. if Π( ,γ( ),a 1
") − Π( ,γ( ),a 2
") > 0. After some manipulation, we see that a





") − B( ,a 2
")π2( ,a 2
")
≡ γ∗( ). (1)
Were the court’s liquidation probability to exceed γ∗( ), then the entrepreneur would choose the
low probability default action, a2
";w e r eγ( ) < γ∗( ), then the entrepreneur would always choose
the high probability default action a1
". γ∗( ) can be loosely interpreted as the entrepreneur’s
private beneﬁt-cost ratio associated with taking the high default probability action. The numerator
represents the potential increase in lifetime beneﬁts to the entrepreneur from taking the high default
probability action, while the denominator represents the increased second period loss due to the
reduced probability of receiving a payoﬀ in period 2 associated with taking the high default action.





" if γ( ) ≤ γ∗( )
a2
" if γ( ) > γ∗( )
  ∈ {g,b}. (2)
2.1 Optimal choices of γ( )
2.1.1 Good Entrepreneurs
To discourage a good entrepreneur from taking the high default probability action, i.e., from taking
the action ag = a1
g,e q u a t i o n( 1 )i m p l i e st h a tt h ec o u r tm u s tc h o o s eas u ﬃciently high liquidation
probability γ(g) ≥ γ∗(g). It follows immediately that,
Lemma 1: If the court chooses to discourage the high default probability action by a good entrepre-
neur, then it optimally liquidates a good ﬁrm that enters bankruptcy with probability γ(g)=γ∗(g) .
If, instead, the court chooses not to discourage the high default action by a good entrepreneur, then
it optimally chooses γ(g)=0 .
Setting γ(g) > γ∗(g), i.e. mis-identifying a good ﬁrm as bad with a probability exceeding γ∗(g),
discourages a good entrepreneur from taking the high default probability action, but does so at an
unnecessarily higher cost–an excessively high proportion of good entrepreneurs is liquidated. The







g) − c]. (3)
11If courts choose to encourage the high default probability action ag = a1
g, then the liquidation
probability must be set so that γ(g) < γ∗(g). Clearly, in such a case it is optimal to set γ(g)=0





Proposition 1: It is optimal to encourage the low default probability action for good entrepreneurs,
ag = a2





The left-hand side reﬂects the potential gains from discouraging a good entrepreneur from taking
the high default probability action: expected lifetime project revenues are increased and the ﬁrm
is less likely to incur investigation costs in bankruptcy. The right-hand side reﬂects the costs: to
discourage a good entrepreneur from taking the high default action, the court must occasionally
mistakenly identifying bankrupt good entrepreneurs as bad, and liquidate them.
It is useful to rewrite equation (5) in terms of γ∗(g). Doing so reveals that it is optimal to
discourage a good entrepreneur from taking the high default probability action if and only if the
court does not have to make too many mistakes in order to induce a good entrepreneur to take
action a2


















The left-hand side of the inequality reﬂects a good entrepreneur’s private trade-oﬀ from undertaking
the high default probability action, while the right-hand side of the inequality reﬂects the society’s
trade-oﬀ from discouraging this action. Good entrepreneurs refrain from taking the high default
action if, relatively speaking, the probability of liquidation is high enough–i.e., if B(g,a1
g) is
suﬃciently larger than B(g,a2
g)–and/or if the potential proﬁt gain from taking the high default
action,
S
t ∆πt(g), is small. It is socially optimal to discourage a good entrepreneur from taking
the high default action if the requisite liquidation probability, γ∗(g), is, relatively speaking, “small
enough.” The requisite liquidation probability will be (relatively) small if the changes in lifetime
revenues and changes in bankruptcy rates are large and if the expected costs associated with
liquidating a good entrepreneur, B(g,a2
g)(R2(g,a2
g) − z(g,a2
g)), are not too large.
Note that for some interpretations of the action choice, it would never be optimal to design
a court that mis-identiﬁes good entrepreneurs: for some action choice interpretations a good en-
trepreneur’s private interests over action choice are aligned with society’s (as long as bankruptcy
12costs are not too high). For example, let action a2
g correspond to having a ﬁre sale and a1
g cor-
r e s p o n dt on o th a v i n gaﬁre sale. Although a ﬁre sale decreases the probability of default in the







t ∆Rt(g) > 0. But then the right-hand
side of (6) is negative provided that bankruptcy costs are not too high; it is, therefore, optimal for
the court to set γ(g)=0 . Intuitively, the court would not encourage the low default probability ﬁre
sale action since it entails social costs with no oﬀsetting beneﬁts. So, too, if action a2
g corresponds
to “working too hard,” then interests are aligned.
In contrast, if action a1
g corresponds to theft or a risky negative NPV investment, then action
a1




g).S i n c e
S
t∆Rt(g) < 0, there are social beneﬁts associated with discouraging the high default (theft)
action. If this beneﬁti ss u ﬃciently great, i.e., if inequality (6) holds, then by its choice of liquidation
probability, the court will encourage a good entrepreneur to take the low default (no theft) action.
These observations highlight that the optimal design of the court will depend crucially on the
nature of action choices that entrepreneurs are likely to undertake that have the biggest impact
on payoﬀs. In this paper, we do not take a stand on which action choices are most important,
but merely derive the consequences of the way in which action choices aﬀect payoﬀs for the court’s
optimal design.
2.1.2 Bad Entrepreneurs
Lemma 2: If the court chooses to discourage bad entrepreneurs from taking the high default prob-
ability action, then it always liquidates bad ﬁrms that enter bankruptcy. If, instead, the court
chooses to encourage the high default action by bad entrepreneurs, then it liquidates bad ﬁrms with
probability γ(b)=γ∗(b).
Any liquidation probability γ(b) ∈ (γ∗(b),1] will discourage bad entrepreneurs from choosing
the high default probability action (e.g., taking a risky negative NPV project, stealing, shirking,
no ﬁre sale). It follows immediately that the court should choose the liquidation probability that
induces ab = a2
b at the minimum cost, i.e., it should choose γ(b)=1 . That is, given that bad
entrepreneurs do not choose the high default action, it is optimal to identify all bad entrepreneurs






b) − c). (7)
If, instead, courts wish to encourage bad entrepreneurs to take the high default action, then it is
optimal to set γ(b)=γ∗(b); i.e., it is optimal to select the largest liquidation probability consistent
13with a bad entrepreneur choosing ab = a1
b (e.g., preventing a ﬁre sale that shifts cash ﬂows ahead







b) − c]. (8)
Proposition 2: It is optimal for the court to encourage bad entrepreneurs to take the high default








The left-hand side of equation (9) reﬂects the loss incurred resulting from encouraging bad en-
trepreneurs to take the high default probability action. The right-hand side reﬂects the potential
gains: If γ∗(b)B(b,a1
b) >B (b,a2
b), then more bad entrepreneurs will be identiﬁed if they take the
high default action, even though some will slip through because the court makes mistakes in order
to have the opportunity to identify bad entrepreneurs. If the above inequality does not hold, then
it is always optimal to set γ(b)=1 .
Rewriting equation (9) in terms of γ∗(b), reveals that it is optimal to encourage the high default
action if and only if the court does not have to make too many mistakes in order to induce a bad





















Again, the right-hand side represents the social beneﬁt-cost ratio from discouraging a bad entre-
preneur from taking the high default probability action, while the left-hand side represents a bad
entrepreneur’s private trade-oﬀ for undertaking the high default action. A bad entrepreneur will
take the high default action only if he is suﬃciently likely to be mistaken by the court for a good
entrepreneur. Intuitively, encouraging a bad entrepreneur to take the high default action tends to
be optimal if
• The action is attractive to a bad entrepreneur (i.e., his potential proﬁtg a i n ,∆π1(b)+∆π2(b),
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b)) are low and the ex-





14Comparing γcourt(b) with γcourt(g), we see that there is an additional consideration in the
court design for the bad entrepreneur: The court may want to encourage bad entrepreneurs to
take the high default action in order to increase the probability that bad entrepreneurs go into
bankruptcy, and hence the probability that they are liquidated.
The interests of a bad entrepreneur and society are never aligned over bankruptcy, in the sense
that bad entrepreneurs prefer a lower bankruptcy probability, whereas society prefers a higher bank-
ruptcy probability. Excepting this consideration, however, whether a bad entrepreneur’s interests
are aligned with society’s interests depends on the action interpretation in ways similarly to those
discussed for good entrepreneurs.
3C o n ﬁscation: Perk consumption and Fire Sales
We now focus on speciﬁc interpretations of the action choices. In particular, we assume that an
entrepreneur can conﬁs c a t es o m eo ft h eﬁrm’s resources. The conﬁscated resources can be used
either to supplement ﬁrst period revenues or for the entrepreneur’s personal consumption. In a ﬁre
sale, an entrepreneur conﬁscates some of the ﬁrm’s infrastructure, liquidates it in the market and
then uses the liquidation proceeds to supplement ﬁrst period revenues. A ﬁre sale raises current
period revenues and proﬁts, and lowers default probabilities at the expense of future period revenues
and proﬁts, as well as total revenues. A bad entrepreneur may have an incentive to have a ﬁre
sale to avoid default. Alternatively, an entrepreneur can consume the proceeds from the liquidated
infrastructure as well as some of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period cash ﬂow. As with a ﬁre sale, an entrepreneur
who “consumes perks” reduces future revenues and proﬁts, but doing so reduces rather than raises
ﬁrst period revenues and default rates. A good entrepreneur might be tempted to engage in perk
consumption since he may be unlikely to be liquidated in default.
For the bad entrepreneur, action a2
b corresponds to undertaking a ﬁre sale. A ﬁre sale entails










bad entrepreneur may want to pursue a ﬁre sale in order increase ﬁrst period expected revenues
and proﬁts, but it is at the expense of second period revenues, proﬁts and liquidation values.
For a good entrepreneur, action a1
g corresponds to consuming perks: “stealing” cash ﬂows and/or
infrastructure and consuming them. To the extent that a good entrepreneur must conceal these









g). A good entrepreneur may want to steal in order to
increase ﬁrst period proﬁt s ,a l b e i ta tt h ee x p e n s eo fﬁrst period revenues and second period proﬁts,
15revenues and liquidation values.
Section 2 considered a court that was unconstrained in its signal choices. In practice, the court
may be more limited both by what evidence is feasible to provide and in how it can design signal
qualities through its choice of rules of evidence, etc. In this section we consider how outcomes are
aﬀected when the court has access only to a more limited class of signals. A natural choice for a
restricted class of signals is that where the court is as likely to mis-identify a bad entrepreneur as
good, as it is to mis-identify a good entrepreneur as bad: γ(b)=1−γ(g). That is, the court makes
“symmetric” errors across diﬀerent types. Not only might this be viewed as natural choice, but it
turns out that this choice has optimality properties for the types of action choices considered here.
3.1 No Renegotiation
When a court makes errors, both parties have an incentive to renegotiate the existing contract
to circumvent the error-riven court. The gains to renegotiation generally rise when the court
selects its monitoring policy from a more restricted class. To distinguish most sharply how each
feature–a court that errs and renegotiation–aﬀects outcomes, we proceed in two steps. First,
in an environment with no renegotiation, we contrast outcomes when the court must adopt the
symmetric evaluation technology with those where the court faces no restrictions on the evaluation
technology. We then analyze how the possibility of renegotiation aﬀects the outcomes.
Suppose ﬁrst that γ∗(b) < 1 − γ∗(g). Then the optimal error rate is one of
• γ(g)=0=1−γ(b). Here all defaulting entrepreneurs are perfectly identiﬁed. However, good
entrepreneurs consume perks and bad entrepreneurs have ﬁre sales.
• γ(g)=γ∗(g) < 1−γ∗(b). Good entrepreneurs are induced to refrain from consuming perks but
bad entrepreneurs continue to engage in ﬁre sales1 (and hence does not reduce the probability
that he is funded in the second period). Defaulting entrepreneurs of both types are no longer
perfectly identiﬁed.
• γ(g)=1− γ∗(b) > γ∗(g). Good entrepreneurs now refrain from consuming perks, but at a
slightly higher error rate than when the court was unconstrained. As a result, more good
entrepreneurs are liquidated. This higher error rate may be justiﬁed since it prevents bad
entrepreneurs from having a ﬁre sale.
Any other error rate unnecessarily introduces greater rates of error than one of these alternatives,
while inducing the same behavior by entrepreneurs. The key observation is that to choose the error
1Since 1 − γ(b)=γ(g)=γ
∗(g),t h e n1 − γ(b) < 1 − γ
∗(b) or γ(b) > γ
∗(b).
16probability eﬃciently for one entrepreneur type one must introduce ineﬃciencies for the other
entrepreneur type. For example, if γ(g)=γ∗(g), then a good type is eﬃciently induced not to
consume perks, but a bad entrepreneur’s behavior is unaﬀected by the introduction of court error.
As a result, the bad entrepreneur may be mis-identiﬁed and hence not liquidated following a default.
This reduces the value of a error-prone court, perhaps to the point that it is optimal to have a
court that makes no errors.
If, instead γ∗(b) > 1 − γ∗(g), then the optimal error rate is one of
• γ(g)=0=1− γ(b). Again, all defaulting entrepreneurs are perfectly identiﬁed, but good
entrepreneurs consume perks and bad entrepreneurs have ﬁre sales.
• γ(g)=1−γ∗(b) < γ∗(g). Bad entrepreneurs cease to conduct ﬁre sales. Good entrepreneurs
continue to consume perks and in default are sometimes liquidated.
• γ(g)=γ∗(g) > 1 − γ∗(b). Good entrepreneur are induced not to consume perks and bad
entrepreneurs continue to refrain from ﬁre sales. However, the error rate now exceeds that
required to induce bad entrepreneurs from having ﬁre sales.
The more limited evaluation technology reduces the value of designing a court that makes
errors, relative to an environment in which the court is unconstrained in its evaluation technology.
Qualitatively, the value of noisy evaluation is reduced because to alter the behavior of one type but
not the other, the court also must err for the second type; and to aﬀect the behavior of both types,
g e n e r i c a l l y ,t h ee r r o rr a t em u s tb eu n n e c e s s a r i l yh i g hf o ro n et y p e .T h ec o s t so fs u c hm i s - d e s i g n s
depend on the speciﬁcation of the economy in the expected ways (e.g. upon the productivities of
each entrepreneurial type if re-ﬁnanced, the costs of the action choices, etc.). Generally, however,
the optimal design of the court’s monitoring technology should not be error free, because with an
error-free court, entrepreneurs take actions that are socially sub-optimal. Indeed, the optimal error
rate may be increased because, with an unconstrained evaluation technology, it may be optimal
to err for one type of entrepreneur, but not the other;2 but with the more limited evaluation
technology, the court sometimes errs in identifying both types.
We now explore how the analysis is altered by renegotiation. Incorporating a single signal
quality generally reduces the value of an error-riven court. In contrast, if the parties can sometimes
renegotiate and reach a settlement, this circumvents the error-making by the court, leaving only
the incentive eﬀects for entrepreneurs and raising the value of a court that errs. In what follows, we
characterize conditions under which if creditors and debtors can always renegotiate and creditors
2Recall that this asymmetric technology can be implemented by placing the entire burden of proof on one party.
17have all of the bargaining power then a blind court design can implement the social optimum.
Further, we identify situations where a completely uninformed court can implement the social
optimum and where it cannot.
Qualitatively, both factors are relevant: while the court may have limited ﬂexibility in condition-
ing signal quality on type, the parties can probably only sometimes renegotiate to reach a private
settlement ( e.g. because a bankrupt entrepreneur may lack access to the funds required to make
the payment to the creditor that would circumvent the bankruptcy court). In such environments,
it would be optimal for the court only to be “near-sighted,” but not completely “blind.”
3.2 Renegotiation
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is characterized by a prolonged and involved bargaining session between
the ﬁrm and creditors. Creditors and entrepreneur may be able to renegotiate in bankruptcy and
reach a superior outcome by agreeing on the eﬃcient liquidation decision. In particular, a bad
entrepreneur and creditor may agree to liquidate the ﬁrm and provide the entrepreneur with some
of the liquidation payoﬀs; or a good entrepreneur may oﬀer the creditor a greater share of the ﬁrm’s
proceeds if the creditor lets the ﬁrm operate. In both cases, agents circumvent the error-prone court.
If an entrepreneur defaults, a cost of c is incurred (which represents the cost associated with
renegotiation and/or using the court). If the entrepreneur and creditor fail to resolve their dispute
via renegotiation, the court then evaluates the entrepreneur and liquidates according to (γ(b),γ(g)),
where γ(b)=1−γ(g). We assume that while the creditor does not observe the entrepreneur’s type
or the action taken, and that the creditor has all of the bargaining power in any renegotiations.
We do not place any restrictions on when renegotiation can occur. For example, if the entre-
preneur does not default, then the creditor can propose always a renegotiation oﬀer, which the
entrepreneur can accept or reject.
We assume that 0 < γ∗(g) < γ∗(b) < 1. The fact that both critical values are strictly between
zero and one implies that the court can inﬂuence the behavior of entrepreneurs through its choice
of γ(g).S i n c eγ∗(g) < γ∗(b), good entrepreneurs should be liquidated less frequently than bad if
there are no constraints on the evaluation technology.
In renegotiation, a bad entrepreneur would want to liquidate rather than take his chances in
court if the creditor pays him at least (1−γ(b))π2(b,ab) in return, where ab is the action that the
bad entrepreneur took in period 1. This payment corresponds to the bad entrepreneur’s expected
payment if he takes his chances in court. Similarly, a good entrepreneur would pay the creditor up
to γ(g)π2(g,ag), in exchange for avoiding the court and operating the ﬁrm in period 2. Consider
18the following renegotiation oﬀer that the creditor might make following a default in an equilibrium
where, at date 1, good entrepreneurs take action ag and bad entrepreneurs take action ab.
Renegotiation Oﬀer: “If you (the entrepreneur) agree to liquidate, then you will receive P(b,ab);
if you do not want to liquidate and continue into period 2, then to avoid running the risk of the
court erring, you must pay me (the creditor) an additional γ(g)π2(g,ag) in period 2. If you reject
this oﬀer, you will go to court.”
Suppose that the creditor makes this renegotiation oﬀer and P(b,ab) is such that neither type
of entrepreneur rejects it in order to take their chances in court. A good entrepreneur would prefer
to pay γ(g)π2(g) in exchange for running the ﬁrm in period 2 to taking the liquidation contract
meant for a bad entrepreneur if the liquidation payment, P(b,ab), is not “too high,” i.e., if
A. (1 − γ(g))π2(g,ag) ≥ P(b,ab).
A bad entrepreneur would agree to liquidate, rather than make a payment that would enable
him to circumvent the court and run the ﬁrm in period 2, if the liquidation payment, P(b,ab),i s
“suﬃciently high,” i.e., if
B. P(b,ab) ≥ π2(b,ab) − γ(g)π2(g,ag).
Together, conditions A and B imply that (1−γ(g))π2(g,ag) ≥ P(b) ≥ π2(b,ab)−γ(g)π2(g,ag).
Note that if π2(g,ag) > π2(b,ab), then there always exists a P(b,ab) that satisﬁes conditions A and
B.T h i s“ e ﬃcient liquidation” renegotiation oﬀer is incentive compatible if
1. It satisﬁes conditions A and B, and
2. The creditor is willing to make an oﬀer that satisﬁes conditions A and B.
It is incentive compatible for a bad entrepreneur to accept the renegotiation oﬀer and liquidate if and
only if doing so dominates both (i) not settling and taking its chances in court, which has expected
payoﬀ (1 − γ(b))π2(b,ab); and (ii) passing himself oﬀ as a good entrepreneur, and circumventing
the court in return for the payment of γ(g)π2(g,ag). If the creditor makes an incentive compatible
renegotiation oﬀer, then the creditor will make the smallest payment necessary to induce a bad
entrepreneur to liquidate, setting
P(b)=m a x {π2(b,ab) − γ(g)π2(g,ag),(1 − γ(b))π2(b,ab)}.
19However, it may not be in the creditor’s best interest to make this “eﬃcient liquidation” rene-
gotiation oﬀer. For example, if the payment to the bad entrepreneur necessary to ensure incentive
compatibility is too high, the creditor may prefer to make a renegotiation oﬀer in which P(b,ab)=0 .
In this situation, a good entrepreneur would pay γ(g))π2(g,ag) in order to continue operating the
ﬁrm in period 2, but a bad entrepreneur would reject the oﬀer and take his chances in court.
The question then arises: When would the creditor prefer to make an eﬃcient liquidation
renegotiation oﬀer that both entrepreneur types would prefer to taking their chances in court?
Lemma 3: Suppose that π2(g,ag) > π2(b,ab). Then, if bad entrepreneurs prefer taking their
chances in court to mimicking good entrepreneurs, i.e. if
(1 − γ(b))π2(b,ab) ≥ π2(b,ab) − γ(g)π2(g,ag), (11)
then the creditor always makes an eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer, setting P(b,ab)=( 1−
γ(b))π2(b,ab). If, instead, bad entrepreneurs prefer to mimic good entrepreneurs to taking their
chances in court, so that (11) does not hold, then the creditor makes an eﬃcient liquidation rene-
gotiation oﬀer with P(b,ab)=π2(b,ab) − γ(g)π2(g,ag), only if
γ(g)(z(b,ab) − R2(b,ab)+π2(b,ab)+π2(g,ag)) ≥ π2(b,ab). (12)
Proof: If (11) holds, the creditor’s payoﬀ from renegotiation oﬀer P(b,ab)=( 1− γ(b))π2(b,ab) is
z(b,ab) − (1 − γ(b))π2(b,ab). (13)
If he instead oﬀers P(b,ab)=0 , he expects
γ(b)z(b,ab)+( 1− γ(b))(R2(b,ab) − π2(b,ab)). (14)
Since z(b,ab) >R 2(b,ab) it follows that (13) exceeds (14). The bad entrepreneur is indiﬀerent
between accepting P(b,ab) and going to court, so he accepts.
If, instead, (11) does not hold, then the payoﬀ from making an incentive compatible eﬃcient
liquidation renegotiation oﬀer is
z(b,ab) − (π2(b,ab) − γ(g)π2(g,ag)),
while the payoﬀ from making the renegotiation oﬀer with P(b,ab)=0is
γ(b)z(b,ab)+( 1− γ(b))(R2(b,ab) − π2(b,ab)).
The payoﬀs from the eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer are greater only if (12) holds.
20Deﬁnition: “Blind justice” is a court design where γ(g)=γ(b)=0 .5.
If the court design is blind, then the court ignores all information, essentially deciding whether
or not to liquidate an entrepreneur on the basis of a fair coin ﬂip.
Corollary 1: If the court design is blind and if π2(g,ag) > π2(b,ab), then creditors will make
entrepreneurs an eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer.
Proof: If γ(g)=γ(b)=0 .5, then condition (12) is satisﬁed.
Corollary 1 implies the following key result:
Proposition 3: It is never optimal to have an error-free court.
Proof: Here we prove that “blind justice” dominates an error-free court. An error-free court makes
eﬃcient liquidation decisions, but both entrepreneurs choose socially ineﬃcient actions, ag = a1
g and
ab = a2
b. When justice is blind, Corollary 1 ensures that if π2(g,ag) > π2(b,ab) then the creditor will
make an eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer, so that again all liquidation outcomes are socially
eﬃcient. The actions that entrepreneurs take depend upon the magnitudes of the critical values
γ∗(g) and γ∗(b).I fγ∗(g) ≤ 0.5 ≤ γ∗(b), then the good entrepreneur chooses not to steal, ag = a2
g,
and the bad entrepreneur does not have a ﬁre sale, ab = a1
b,s i n c eγ∗(g) ≤ γ(g) and γ∗(b) ≥ γ(b).
These are the socially optimal actions and, therefore, they strictly dominate the actions induced
by an error-free court. (Note that since π2(g,a2
g) > π2(b,a1
b), the creditor will, in fact, make an
eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer.) If γ∗(g) < γ∗(b) < 0.5, then the good entrepreneur does
not steal, ag = a2
g, and the bad entrepreneur has a ﬁre sale, ab = a2
b. This outcome strictly
dominates the outcome induced by an error-free court, since here, the good entrepreneur takes
the socially optimal action. The creditor makes an eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer because
π2(g,a2
g) > π2(b,a2
b). Finally, if 0.5 < γ∗(g) < γ∗(b), then the good entrepreneur steals, ag = a1
g,




that the creditor makes an eﬃcient liquidation renegotiation oﬀer. Therefore, blind justice always
performs strictly better than an error-free court.
Suppose now that the entrepreneur does not default at date 1. Even in the absence of a default,
it is still optimal for the bad entrepreneur to be liquidated. It is possible to achieve this outcome
if the creditor and entrepreneur can renegotiate their initial contract at the end of period 1. For
example, suppose that after achieving a level of ﬁrst period revenues results in “no default,” the
creditor oﬀers the entrepreneur π2(b,ab) in exchange for liquidating his ﬁrm, where ab represents the
21equilibrium action taken by the bad entrepreneur. The bad entrepreneur will be indiﬀerent between
accepting this oﬀer and producing in the second period, so the bad entrepreneur will accept this
oﬀer. For all of the possible equilibrium conﬁgurations that might emerge, it will always be the
case that π2(g,ag) > π2(b,ab) implying, the good entrepreneur will always reject the renegotiation
oﬀer. Therefore, when the court is blind, the socially optimal liquidation decisions will always be
implemented, via renegotiation, both in and out of default.
Renegotiation introduces a subtle issue, albeit one that does not aﬀect the above analysis: Rene-
gotiation may alter the “critical values,” γ∗(g) and γ∗(b), that determine whether each entrepreneur
type takes the high default probability action. Recall that those values were deﬁned for a contract
that is not subject to renegotiation (equation (4)). However, when renegotiation is possible, the
initial contract between the entrepreneur and the creditor is altered. If, for example, credit markets
are competitive at the time that the initial contract is negotiated, then the entrepreneur extracts
all of the surplus generated by renegotiation.3
In fact, when credit markets are competitive, the incentives when renegotiation is feasible
correspond to those where it is infeasible: γ∗(g) and γ∗(b) are the appropriate critical values
under renegotiation. To see this, let CN represent that contract that maximizes the entrepreneur’s
expected payoﬀ conditional on: (1) satisfying the creditor’s participation constraint; (2) the court
using γ(g)=γ(b)=γ =0 .5; and (3) no renegotiation. Let the initial contract that the entrepreneur
oﬀers when renegotiation is possible, CR, take the form CR =( α∗;CN) , where α∗ is an up front
lump sum payment from the creditor to the entrepreneur. Given competitive credit markets, the
lump sum payment eﬀectively transfers all gains from renegotiation to the entrepreneur. The lump
sum payment (see the appendix) has the form
α∗ = p(g)α∗(g,ag)+p(b)α∗(b,ab),
where p( ) is the ex ante probability that the entrepreneur is type   and α∗( ,a ") represents the
lump sum transfer of gains that ﬂows to the entrepreneur of type   when he is induced to take
action a". Since contract CR only diﬀers from contract CN by a lump sum payment, CR provides
the same entrepreneurial incentives in terms of action choice as CN.
The equilibrium path is characterized by:
1. The court (or society) chooses (γ(g)=0 .5,γ(b)=0 .5).
2. The entrepreneur oﬀers contract CR =( α∗;CN), which is accepted by the creditor.
3If credit markets are not competitive, then the entrepreneur cannot extract all of the surplus associated with
renegotiation. Qualitatively, the results presented below are not sensitive to the assumed nature of credit markets,
although the precise form of the initial contract is.
223. The entrepreneur takes actions
(a) ag = a2
g and ab = a1
b if γ∗(g) ≤ 0.5 ≤ γ∗(b), i.e., the good entrepreneur does not steal
a n dt h eb a de n t r e p r e n e u rd o e sn o th a v eaﬁre sale.
(b) ag = a2
g and ab = a2
b if γ∗(g) < γ∗(b) < 0.5, i.e., the good entrepreneur does not steal
a n dt h eb a de n t r e p r e n e u rh a saﬁre sale.
(c) ag = a1
g and ab = a1
b if 0.5 < γ∗(g) < γ∗(b), i.e., the good entrepreneur steals and the
bad entrepreneur does not have a ﬁre sale.
4. If the entrepreneur does not default, then the creditor oﬀers the entrepreneur π2(b,ab) in
exchange for liquidating the project: The good entrepreneur will not accept this oﬀer (since
π2(g,ag) > π2(b,ab)) and the bad entrepreneur will accept.
5. If the entrepreneur defaults, then the creditor makes the above mentioned renegotiation of-
fer resulting in the liquidation of the bad entrepreneur and the continuation of the good
entrepreneur.
The equilibrium is characterized by eﬃcient liquidations and continuations: Along the equilib-
rium path, the bad entrepreneur is always liquidated and the good entrepreneur is never liquidated.
Note that, depending upon model parameters, there can be equilibria where bad entrepreneurs have
ﬁre sales and equilibria where they do not; there can be equilibria where good entrepreneurs steal
and equilibria where they do not.
In summary, if the entrepreneur and creditor can always renegotiate, and it is optimal (i)
to encourage bad entrepreneurs to take the high default action in order to reduce their survival
probability, and (ii) to encourage good entrepreneurs to take the low default action, then a blind
court design cannot be improved upon if creditors and entrepreneurs can always renegotiate their
way around the court. Note that our model predicts that even though the ﬁrm does not default,
renegotiations and liquidations may occur and, in the event of default, parties will always settle
out of court. We typcially do not observe liquidations outside of default and do observe defaulting
parties using the court to reshedule their debts. It is the simple and stylized structure of our
model that delivers these predictions. We now consider, in turn, how each of these predictions are
modiﬁed when our model is generalized in rather natural directions.
As we discussed earlier, renegotiation both in and out of bankruptcy may break down. For
example, suppose that with some relatively small probability, good entrepreneurs have an alter-
native opportunity that would pay w, where it is the case that (1) it is socially ineﬃcient for a
23good entrepreneur to take action w, w<R 2(g,ag) − z(g,ag), and (2) in the absence of a rene-
gotiation oﬀer, it is not attractive for a good entrepreneur to pursue the alternative opportunity,
π2(g,ag) >w , but (3) if the good entrepreneur can obtain the payment meant to induce the bad
entrepreneur to default, then the opportunity becomes attractive, w + P(b,ab) > π2(g,ag). Then,
if most entrepreneurs who do not go into default are good, it may not be optimal for creditors to
negotiate with entrepreneurs outside of bankruptcy. That is, even if only a few good entrepreneurs
have such an outside opportunity, the cost of those good entrepreneurs with outside opportunities
passing themselves oﬀ as bad in order to obtain the payment meant for a bad entrepreneur may
exceed the gain from inducing bad entrepreneurs to liquidate. Casual observation suggests that
such renegotiations are infrequent. Conversely, it may be that only a small fraction of entrepreneurs
in bankruptcy are both good and have outside alternatives, and hence would take oﬀer meant for
the bad entrepreneur. Then there is only a small cost to making the above renegotiation oﬀer in
bankruptcy. In such a circumstance, precisely because renegotiation outside of bankruptcy becomes
infeasible, the value of a blind court design may rise relative to that of a court that does not err:
more bad entrepreneurs are liquidated if the court design is blind.
Our model predicts that defaulting parties will always settle out of court. This stark result is
an artifact of our assumption that there are only two types of entrepreneurs. Suppose, instead,
that there are many type of entrepreneurs. In the event of a default, as above, the creditor makes
a renegotiation oﬀer to the entrepreneur that speciﬁes: (i) a payment to the entrepreneur for
liquidating the ﬁrm; (ii) a payment from the entrepreneur to in order to continue operating into
period 2; or (iii) going to court. With many types of entrepreneurs, only the very high quality
entrepreneurs agree to pay in order to continue; only the very low quality entrepreneurs accept
a payment and liquidate; and entrepreneurs of intermediate quality go to court. It follows that
entrepreneurs who reorganize out of court are more successful, on average, in the future than
entrepreneurs who survive and reorganize under the supervision of a court. This prediction is
consistent with the evidence reported by Gilson, John and Lang (1990).
4S t e a l i n g
In this section we assume that the entrepreneur’s action choice is either “steal” or “do not steal,”
and examine the implications for burden of proof and court design. Here, stealing corresponds to
the high default probability action, a1
", and not stealing corresponds to the low default probability
action, a2
". Stealing is not socially optimal of either type of entrepreneur. We simplify the analysis by
assuming that the liquidation value, second period revenues and second period proﬁts are unaﬀected
by ﬁrst period action choices, and that the liquidation value is the same for both entrepreneurial
24types. As a result, the second period proﬁt, second period revenue and the liquidation value
simplify to π2( ), R2( ) and z, respectively. Since it is optimal to liquidate a bad entrepreneur
and to let a good entrepreneur continue in the second period, we have R2(b) <z<R 2(g).M a n y
principal-agent models interpret the agent’s action as being an eﬀo r tl e v e la n dt h a tt h ea g e n tc a n
either “work hard” or “shirk;” it is assumed that it is socially optimal for agents to work hard. By
slightly modifying our model to allow for the non-pecuniary payoﬀ associated with eﬀort one could
interpret action a1
" as shirking and action a2
" as working hard.
If society were unconstrained in its choice of liquidation probabilities and were only concerned
about getting liquidation decisions right, then it would choose γ(g)=0and γ(b)=1 .4 That is, the
court would never liquidate a good entrepreneur and would always liquidate a bad entrepreneur.
Provided that 0 < γ∗( ) < 1 for   ∈ {b,g}, these liquidation probabilities deliver the socially
optimal outcome for the bad entrepreneur, but would induce the good entrepreneur to steal. To
induce the good entrepreneur to not to steal, the court must choose a liquidation probability for
the good entrepreneur of at least γ∗(g).
Consider the following burden of proof rule: An entrepreneur must demonstrate to the court that
he is good, or else he will be liquidated. The burden of proof must be suﬃciently stringent that a
bad entrepreneur is unable to prove to the court that he is good and that a good entrepreneur cannot
not always convince the court that he is good. Occasionally a good entrepreneur will be liquidated
by the court. Such a burden of proof rule implies that the court liquidates a good entrepreneur
with probability γ(g), where γ(g) > 0 and liquidates a bad entrepreneur with probability γ(b)=1 .
Suppose that an entrepreneur defaults. As in Section 3.2, the creditor has an incentive to rene-
gotiate the existing contract in order to eliminate the risk of surplus loss that occurs when a good
entrepreneur is liquidated. In contrast to the previous section, however, creditors do not have an
incentive to renegotiate with a bad entrepreneur–if they could identify –since a bad entrepreneur
will be liquidated with probability one by the court. Unfortunately for the creditor, however, he
cannot distinguish between good entrepreneurs and bad. Consider the following renegotiation oﬀer
that a creditor might make to an entrepreneur following a default:
Renegotiation Oﬀer: “If you (the entrepreneur) want to avoid running the risk of the court
erring, you must pay me (the creditor) an additional γ(g)π2(g) in period 2. If you reject this oﬀer,
t h e ny o uw i l lg ot oc o u r t . ”
Good entrepreneurs will accept the renegotiation oﬀer and agree to pay the creditor an addi-
tional γ(g)π2(g) in period 2. Note, however, if γ(g)π2(g) is not “suﬃciently large,” then bad entre-
4Note that these probabilities satisfy the single signal quality restriction.






the bad entrepreneur will reject the renegotiation oﬀer, go to court, and be liquidated with prob-
ability one. If the courts adopt a “stringent” burden of proof rule, stringent in the sense that
it always liquidates bad entrepreneurs and liquidates the good entrepreneur with probability of
(at least) π2(b)/π2(g), then the liquidation probabilities will result in socially optimal liquidation
decisions. But what about the actions that the entrepreneur takes at date 1?
Since the burden of proof rule implies that γ(b)=1 , the bad entrepreneur will always work
hard, i.e., ab = a1
b,s i n c eγ∗(b) < γ(b)=1 . The good entrepreneur will work hard if γ(g) ≥ γ∗(g).
Hence, society can induce the good entrepreneur to work hard and at the same time generate a





If the court’s liquidation probability for the good entrepreneur satisﬁes (15), then the good entre-
preneur will have an incentive to work hard in the ﬁrst period–since γ(g) ≥ γ∗(g)–and a bad
entrepreneur who defaults will submit to liquidation–since γ(g) ≥ π2(b)/π2(g).
Note that if the court liquidates any entrepreneur that it faces with probability one, i.e., γ(g)=
γ(b)=1 , then at date 1, no entrepreneur steals/all work hard. In addition, a defaulting bad
entrepreneur will be liquidated and a defaulting good entrepreneur will, via renegotiation, continue
to operate at date 2. That is, if the burden of proof is so stringent that no one can demonstrate
that he is good, then the ﬁrst-best outcome can be achieved. This is a rather odd result because
it implies that the court simply liquidates anyone who approaches it. Suppose, however, that
there is a some chance that renegotiation between the creditor and the defaulting entrepreneur
can break down–due to, say, a coordination failure–in which case the entrepreneur faces the
court upon default. If the entrepreneur happens to be bad, then there is no social loss associated
with the breakdown in renegotiation. But, if the entrepreneur is good, then there is a social loss
because he is always liquidated. To minimize the probability of liquidating the good entrepreneur
if renegotiation breaks down and, at the same time, provide incentives for a good entrepreneur to
work hard/not steal, the court’s liquidation probability should be set equal to the right-hand side
of (15).
The equilibrium path for this economic environment is characterized by:
1. The court (or society) imposes a burden of proof rule that implies that γ(b)=1and γ(g)=
max{π2(b)/π2(g),γ∗(g)}.
262. The entrepreneur oﬀers contract CR =( α∗∗,CN), which is accepted by the creditor.5
3. The good entrepreneur chooses action ag = a2
g and the bad entrepreneur chooses action
ab = a2
b.
4. If there is no default, the creditor oﬀers the entrepreneur π2(b) in exchange for liquidation:
the bad entrepreneur will accept the oﬀer and the good entrepreneur will not.
5. If there is a default, the creditor asks for an additional payment of γ(g)π2(g) in period 2 or
else the entrepreneur goes to court: the good entrepreneur accepts this oﬀer and the bad
entrepreneur does not and is ultimately liquidated by the court.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that the optimal design of a bankruptcy court is generally one in which the
court occasionally makes errs, sometimes mistakenly liquidating good entrepreneurs, and failing to
liquidated bad ones. A mistake-prone court
1. May discourage good entrepreneurs from taking actions that lower total ﬁrm value (theft,
shirking, risky negative NPV investments) by raising the cost to them of entering bankruptcy.
2. May encourage ‘bad’ entrepreneurs to take actions that increase the probability that they
will enter bankruptcy (desist from ﬁre sales) and hence liquidated.
We ﬁrst provide conditions under which even where renegotiation is not possible, an error-
prone court is preferred to an error-free court. The optimality of the error-riven court depends on
the beneﬁts of inducing entrepreneurs to take the socially optimal action relative to the costs of
sometimes making incorrect liquidation decisions.
We then consider the optimal court design when creditors and debtors can renegotiation to
circumvent an error-riven court and creditors have all of the bargaining power. Very generally,
we illustrate that the optimal court design is one where the court makes mistakes. The crucial
caveat to this is that there does not exist a “one type ﬁts all” burden of proof rule, that is optimal
independent of the types of actions that agents may take.
If it is optimal to discourage good entrepreneurs from taking actions that raise bankruptcy
probabilities (theft, perk consumption, risky NPV investments, shirking), while discouraging bad
5As in the previous section, C
N represents the contract where renegotiation is not possible and γ(b)=1and
γ(g)=m a x {π2(b)/π2(g),γ
∗(g)}.T h ep a r a m e t e rα
∗∗ represents an up-front lump sum payment that transfers all of
the gains from renegotiation to the entrepreneur.
27entrepreneurs from taking actions that lower bankruptcy probabilities (ﬁre sales, working exces-
sively hard, excessively safe investments), then we show that a blind court, which does not use any
information, dominates an error-free court. Facing a blind court, creditors and debtors negotiate
the ‘correct’ liquidation decision following a default, so that a blind court design induces the same
liquidation decisions as an error-free court. In addition, the blind court design induces entrepre-
neurs to take better actions. Thus, for this class of action choices, the same simple blind court
design leads to better outcomes.
However, if it is instead optimal to discourage bad entrepreneurs from taking actions that
raise bankruptcy probabilities, then we show that the optimal court design places the burden of
proof on the entrepreneur. As a result, the court would sometimes mistakenly liquidating good
entrepreneurs who are unable to document their quality. While the optimal court design is again
simple to implement, it diﬀers from that where the goal is to discourage bad entrepreneurs from
liquidating some of the ﬁrm to avoid bankruptcy.
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30Appendix
To understand the expressions for the components of α∗, suppose the court chooses γ(g)=
γ(b)=γ = .5 when renegotiation is not possible and the contract that is in place is CN.W i t h
contract CN in place and a blind court, the entrepreneur will choose action a2
g if he is good and
action a1
b if he is bad. If renegotiation is possible when the court is blind, then bad entrepreneurs
will be liquidated and good entrepreneurs will continue. Consider the following lump sum payment






This lump sum payment has two components: (1) the surplus generated through renegotiation with
the good entrepreneur, γB(g,a2
g)(R2(g,a2
g) − z), and (2) the payment that the good entrepreneur
gives the creditor if he defaults, γB(g,a2
g)π2(g;a2
g). Now consider a lump sum payment that is
attributable to the bad entrepreneur,
α∗(b,a1
b)=( ( 1− γ)B(b,a1
b)+( 1− B(b,a1
b)) + (z − R2(b) − π2(b,a1
b).
To understand this lump sum payment, note that following a default, renegotiation generates
surplus (1−γ)(z−R2(b)), and the entrepreneur receive portion (1−γ)π2(b,a1
b) of the total surplus;
when the entrepreneur does not default, renegotiation generates a surplus of (z − R2(b)) and the
entrepreneur receives a portion π2(b,a1
b).
When the court is blind and renegotiation is possible suppose that the creditor and entrepreneur




Since α∗ is an up-front lump sum payment, contract CR =( α∗,CN) provides the entrepreneur with
the same incentives when renegotiation is possible as does contract CN when renegotiation is not
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